Dyer Total War

Evolution of War From "Mass War" to "Total War":

The evolution of war from mass war to total war took little more than a century. Since the transition from mass war there have been no barriers of behavior left to breach, only more and more destructive weapons to be used according to principles now universally accepted. In their first involvement in total war Europe found that if the means used to fight a war are total, then so must be the ends. Total war meant it was almost impossible to stop short of total victory for one side and unconditional surrender for the other. Mass war meant war on a large scale, more advanced weapons, but total war meant no rules and no boundaries. This evolution lead to merciless fighting in regards to protecting citizens and the idea of a complete victory without compromise. The best example of total war would be the creation and use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, which killed seventy thousand citizens in five minutes. Total war has meant ruthless use of weaponry, mass destruction, and conscienceless fighting. 

Key Qualities of Total War:

• Total victory on one side and unconditional surrender for the other
• Goal of total victory
• Future of the nation depends on victory
• Original origins of war no longer matter (they are easily lost/forgotten)
• Complete victory without compromise
• Only hope of survival is total military victory
• No mercy tactic
• Attrition 
• Civilian causalities
• No boundaries
• No emotional attachment; only hatred toward enemy
• Destroying industries
• Mass bombing
• Damaging morale
• Utter ruthlessness
• Mass destruction
• No conscience
• "The only way that you can meet force is by force"

What is Total War?

Total war is boundary-less war, a war without rules. Total war is a war where no one is safe and every resource is used to its fullest in order to destroy the enemy and attain complete and utter victory without compromise  Total war spares no one; it is merciless. Civilians are not safe, but rather the main targets. In total war civilians are attacked in order to defeat the nation's morale and civilian support. Weapons are used ruthlessly, the goal is mass destruction, and force can only be met with force. 

The obvious answer is that total war is not ethical because it uses ruthless tactics and kills thousands of civilians in in the process. However, because total war has no rules killing civilian in these cruel ways would be acceptable. Total war seems unethical when we relate it back to our own nation and our own families  We would surely think total war was unacceptable if our loved ones (mothers, children, grandparents) were being killed by aerial bombing, but if it were our enemy, like the Japanese in WWII, we would, and did, gladly accept such a tactic. The civilians may not be the ones fighting but they are still representing and supporting their nation, and in this way attacking the civilians is going straight for the heart and morale of the nation.  In this way killing the civilians is justified, but is it therefore ethical in terms of attaining total victory. So, do the ends justify the means?

Richard Overy Response

Richard Overy argues that "The war was won in 1945 not from German weaknesses but from Allied strengths." How far do you agree with this statement.

For the most part I agree with Richard Overy's statement, that the war in 1945 was won from Allied strengths rather than German weakness. If the Allied had not been as strong as they were during WWII then Germany's weaknesses would not have been as prevalent or as detrimental. If the Allies hadn't dominated Germany in weapon reproduction, weapon advancement, back-up service, and support from the civilians the two opposing forces would have been on a more even playing field. Therefore, Germany's weaknesses would have been matched by Allied weaknesses. However, the Allies victory can not fully be attributed to their strengths. Their strengths led to Germany's weaknesses, making them vulnerable, and, thus, allowed the Allies to pounce on Germany while they were weak and exposed. The outcome of WWII was caused by a series of events. These series were indeed catalyzed by the Allies strengths, but the war could not have been won without Germany's lack of ability to combat those strengths.

However, I do agree with Overy to the extent that the Allies strengths were key to their victory in that they exposed and challenged German deficiencies. With the USA's entrance into the war the Allies gained an economic and military powerhouse. Combining the US and Britain's military strengths and resources pushed the Allies far ahead of the German's in terms of strength, power, and military strategy. In Overy's defense, I think the Allies' ability to successfully plan and carry out military attacks was the main reason the Allies won the war. Unlike the Germans, the Allies welcomed the support of civilians and employed them to fight the home front war; therefore, the Allies' military powers were able to strictly focus on combat and winning the war. On the other hand, Germany's commander of war (Hitler) also had to be concerned with home front issues, such as weapon output and economic ability to keep fighting. The American's had their own team of civilians to manage the organizational side of the war; thus their strength came in superior organizational skills, ability to delegate and distribute military jobs, and home front involvement/support. In conjunction with Overy, the Allies strength that made them unstoppable was their strategic decision to concentrate the mass of their attack on Germany; thus, pulling all resources to take down the backbone of the Axis powers. 

I hesitate to fully agree with Overy's statement because, even though the Allies' strengths pay a majority role in their victory, I think Mussolini's Italy also played a role in helping the Allies. Many of Germany's weaknesses came  from their alliance with Italy. Italy proved to be a major weakness for Germany. For example, having to stay an extra six weeks in the Balkans to aid Italy caused Hitler's army to be delayed in their attack on Moscow. These six weeks ultimately led to their defeat because the German army was ill prepared for the harsh Russian winter. Also, Italy's inability to fend off the U.S. and Britain during their invasion caused Hitler to have to divide his army between Italy and Russia. Having to pull resources from Russia, helped the Russian Army defeat the now weakened and outnumbered Germans. In my opinion, Italy's lack of support, but rather consumption of German resources, attributed to the war's outcome, more than anything. 

WWII in Europe

1. Why did Hitler assume his air force could defeat Britain alone?

Hitler assumed his air force could defeat Britain alone because it was able to do so in the Battle of France; thus, he was given a false idea of how powerful his air force was. Basing his air force's success off of the Battle of France, a battle against a nation extremely unprepared in comparison, was foolish on Hitler's part. Hitler thought the power of his Luftwaffe would cause Britain to surrender and come to him in negotiation. Also, Hitler's success using the 'Blitz' strategy in France lead him to believe his air force could do the same and easily take down Britain with the same ease and quickness. 

2. What factor, in your opinion, was the most important in Britain's victory in the Battle of Britain?

In my opinion, Britain's revolutionary new warning system, the radar was the most important factor in Britain's victory over Germany in the Battle of Britain. The radar gave them a military advantage over Germany, something Germany usually had. It allowed Britain's RAF to locate the incoming enemy. The radar would show when an enemy aircraft was within 120 km. This really helped the British win the battle because it meant they didn't have to use some of the RAFs as patrol air crafts, looking for the enemy instead of fighting them. Having more planes to fight Germany gave Britain an advantage in numbers. Also, the radar system allowed them to be better prepared for an enemy attack. 

3.  Why did Hitler invade into the Balkans and why was this significant?

 Hitler invaded the Balkans due to Mussolini's failure in do so himself. Italy was an ally to Germany and thus Germany rushed into the Balkans in order to assist their ally. Hitler's invasion into the Balkans is of high significant because in assisting Mussolini in Greece Hitler was forced to delay his attack on the USSR by a crucial six weeks. These six weeks were so crucial and ultimately decided the outcome of the war because it impacted the chances of the Germany army reaching Moscow before the harsh Russian winter arrived (which they did not and thus let the Russian army launch a counter-offensive). 

4. What were Hitler's motives for attacking the USSR?

Hitler attacked the USSR in hopes of gaining more territory, or living space, for the German people. The natural resources the USSR provided, including oil, were vast and would certainly help in Hitler's dream of expanding the German race. However, Hitler's main motive for attacking the USSR was ideological. Hitler strongly wanted to destroy a country that was not only filled with people inferior in his eyes, the Slavs, but also filled with communists. Hitler believed communism was one of the greatest threats to German society and culture, and thus must be destroyed. 

5. What factors slowed the initial blitzkrieg of Russia?

In the very beginning Britain's refusal to make peace with Germany slowed Hitler's plans for Russia. However, frustrated at the delay, Hitler finally decided to leave Britain undefeated. He believed Britain would not be in a strong enough position to launch a second front and the USSR would be easily defeated. 

Every Man A Soldier Reading Response

 What did Keegan mean when he said, "For the truth of twentieth-century European civilization was that the world it dominated was pregnant with war."

With this quote Keegan comments how the first world war had not left Europe completely defenseless or broke, yet still thirsty and ready for another war. With the Industrial Revolution helping Europe's economy many European nations depended on the production of weaponry and military goods to sustain their economies and keep their population employed. Similar to the idea of war in the book 1984, Europe was ready for another war, for it was helping  nations economically and bringing citizens together in a common effort to beat the enemy. The idea of war was contagious in Europe, so to say. The Industrial Revolution also brought technological advancements that nations and armies were eager to use, as Keegan states, " The technology that built the railways also furnished the weapons with which the soldiers of the new armies would inflict mass casualties on each other" (16). Scientists were finding dual purposes for resources, and those dual purposes were uses in wartime; thus, making Europe more than ready and willing for another war. Also, Germany is a prime example of Keegan's quote; after the Treaty of Versailles Germany was eagerly plotting and waiting for a chance to prove its strength as a nation. Germany was extremely pregnant with war; it was infatuated with the idea of revenge and cleaning its reputation of disgrace and embarrassment  caused by the Treaty. Keegan's idea that European civilization was pregnant with war is very accurate as it saw some economic advantages and technological advancements that were products of the first world war and were curious to see what new things could harbor from another war. 

Clausewitz's Statement of War

My group read section 23 and we said:
War is always a serious means for a serious object.

War is not simply a series of mines going off, but it is a series of pulses of violence whose consequences we cannot necessarily have full control of. Although war is often motivated by a political cause, the aim of the original policy may become lost in the process of winning the war.

Clausewitz boils war down to a very simplistic definition that somewhat contradicts his later statement of it being a political cause. He says, "War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale." He goes on to say that war is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will. The manner in which Clausewitz defines war makes it seem so basic and humanistic. This human like aspect of war is something we tend to forget when our nation is at war. We tend to see it more as an animistic thing that is eating away at our nation, but like Clausewitz reminds us, our fellow civilians are fighting for political causes that involve our nation and affect us in some fashion. Clausewitz argues that war is both simplistic in nature, but complex once battle begins and control and motives are lost due to lust for violence and pure desire to win. 

WWII 1939-1941 Timeline

Collective Security's Failure

     Why did collective security fail to keep the peace between 1920 and 1935?

Thesis: Collective Security failed to keep the peace between 1920 and 1935 due to its unwillingness to effectively punish the aggressor, its lack of force, and its fear of acting against nations within the League if necessary.

Supporting Claims:
1. The League's lack of will to effectively step in and punish the aggressor in times of crisis, such as the Manchuria Crisis of 1931, showed the League's weakness during a time of need and ultimately made them less credible and feared. By not stepping in and stopping the aggressor, like the League said they would, showed the selectivity of the League and lack of coherence as a group; thus, making it hard to respect their word.
2. The League of Nation's decision to use economic embargo instead of military force when trying to stop an aggressor ultimately led to its failure when its main economic backer, the U.S., faced the Great Depression and the League's only backbone was lost. Without a military force at its ready the League was only feared based on its word, which later proved to hold no weight. Also, the lack of the participating nations to want to risk any of their military also shows how committed they truly were to the success of the League; every participating nation put their own nation's safety and well being above all. In having a military force the League would at least of had tangible proof to back its word, even if it never used its military force, the image of all the nations' militaries coming after a nation could scare that nation into behaving.
3. The League of Nation's major downfall was its fear of acting against a member nation if it were to become the aggressor. In the case of the Manchuria Crisis the other member nations feared Japan and its power so much so that it made them only suggest to Japan that they give the land back to China rather than apply force to get it back. The League's rules did not apply the same for all nations; this is best seen with the way the League let Japan get away with taking advantage of China's weakness because it, too, feared Japan's power.

Concrete Details:

• Absence of Major Powers in the League of Nations: Without the US the League of Nations lacked military force and economic control. The League was a good idea in theory but without its creator it was nothing. Also, after Germany and Japan left the League by the early 1930s the it lacked major countries' power, and thus credibility. With only France, Italy, and Britain left as major world powers the League was void of the necessary resources to stop an aggressor. Plus with Germany and Japan on the outside Britain and France were now afraid to act out against either of them if they were to become the aggressor because it would put their own nation and limited resources at risk. 
• The Depression: The economic downfall of 1929 in the US and how greatly it affected the League of Nations shows how dependent the League was on the US economy for its success. As the US could not provide resources to other countries they became weak. Their focus shifted to sustaining their own nation, rather than doing what was best for the League. Due to this economic upheaval, the main use of force for the League, countries within the League became unwilling to risk their own limited resources for another country, ruining the spirit of the League. 
• Manchurian Crisis (1931): The League's lack of support of China and willingness to punish Japan was the first sign that the League was not ready to handle crisis when dealing with a major power. The League was great in theory, but when reality struck and the League was forced to act none of the participating nations wanted to do anything to reprimand Japan out of fear of what Japan, a world power, might do to them in return. 

What was the League of nations intended to do?

• The League of Nations intended to spread peace throughout Europe by forming a group of allied nations that would work together in protecting each other and in protecting other nations from an aggressor. 

To what extent do you believe the League of Nations was able to accomplish this based on its structure according to the League of Nations Covenant? (See Student Study Section pg. 89)

• Based on the Covenant the League of Nations should have been able to accomplish this because its system is set up similarly to that of the U.S. government. There are different departments and branches with different functions that also work together to ensure that the goal is being reached. However, the checks and balances in this system were lacking, as the large countries held more power and say than the smaller ones. Also, in the League the member nations always acted with their nation's best intentions and safety first most in mind when deciding for the League, rather than for the good of all, which is how it should have worked if checks and balances were in place.

Why, according to the packet, did collective security fail in 1930's?

•  Collective security failed in the 1930s mainly because of the U.S.'s economic crisis, which in turn revealed the weaknesses of the League. It showed that the member nations were more concerned with their own nation's economic problems than the League's involvement in acting against an aggressor. It limited the League's resources and made them unable to successfully act against the aggressor when the time came; it had no power to back its word without the U.S.'s economic support.